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Engineering Risk Assessment Activity!
Space Mission, Campaign &  
System Risk Analyses 
•  Ares V Mars campaign 
•  CxAT Lunar Surface Systems 
•  HEFT II campaign to a NEO 
•  Aquila II 
•  SWORDS 
Agency Risk Methodology & 
Requirements Development 
•  Liquid/Solid Propellant Study for 
NASA’s Study of Rockets 
•  CCP requirements development 
•  OSMA PRA guide chapters and 
training modules. 
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U.S.	launches	with	liquid	stage	
failures
all	types
process
design
unknown
weather
LV	with	at	least	1	LRE
Asteroid Threat Assessment 
Project (ATAP) 
•  Physics-based impact risk model 
•  Fragmentation/breakup 
•  Crater-forming impact 
•  Ground damage assessment 
Characterization	
Entry &	
Breakup	
Blast 	
Propagation	
Ground 
Damage	
Crew Launch Vehicle Risk Assessment 
& Risk-Informed Design 
•  Ares I/V integrated LOM/LOC 
•  SLS abortability 
•  SNC Dream Chaser mission risk modeling 
•  SpaceX DragonRider ascent risk sensitivity 
Outline!
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Approach Application!
• Risk-informed 
decision support 
− Requirement verification 
− Design optimization 
− Selection/procurement 
• PRA is informative, 
not predictive 
− Provides quantitative 
answers to specific 
questions 
− Always driven by specific 
application 
− Based on traditional 
methods and extended 
as appropriate 
Pessimistic 
bounds!
Architecture! Model inputs!
Physical model!
Assess risk 
drivers!
Risk 
acceptable?!
Solution 
reached!
Assumption 
driven?!
Architecture 
driven?!
Refine inputs	
Design trades	
Iterative, responsive 
modeling approach 
What is ERA?!
Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) extends traditional 
Probabilistic Safety/Risk Assessment (PRA/PSA) approaches to 
incorporate: 
!
•  Physics-based analysis 
of key risk factors 
• External hazards 
• Failure environments 
•  Dynamic nature of 
failures 
• Time dependence 
• State dependence 
• Interactive effects  
Crewed Launch Mission!
Nominal Mission	
Abort	
Launch Abort System	
Crew Module	
Service Module	
Second Stage	
Upper Stage Engine	
First Stage	
Integrated Ascent Risk Modeling!
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Hybrid Risk Modeling Approach!
•  Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) extends traditional Probabilistic Safety/ Risk 
Assessment (PSA/PRA) approaches to incorporate: 
− Physics-based analysis of key risk factors 
− Dynamic nature of failures 
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Launch Vehicle Explosion Risk Assessment!
 
Space 	
Launch	
System	
(SLS)	
Failure Propagation	
Aborting 	
Crew	
Module	
•  Impact design by focusing physics-
based analysis on risk driving Hazard 
Environments 
•  Launch vehicle stage explosion 
hazards to crew 
Blast Overpressure  Fireball Debris Strike 
Outline!
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Failure Propagation"
Ref:!
S. Lawrence, D. Mathias, K. Gee, “A Failure Propagation Modeling 
Method for Launch Vehicle Safety Assessment,” PSAM 12, Honolulu 
HI, June 2014. !
D. Mathias, S. Motiwala, “Simulation of Liquid Rocket Engine Failure 
Propagation Using Self-Evolving Scenarios,” RAMS, Palm Harbor FL, 
January 2015.!
!
!
! ! ! ! ! !!
Integrated Ascent Risk Modeling!
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For a given: 
− Initial manifestation 
− Mission phase 
− Warning time 
Abortability Flow-Chart: Simple Example!
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Propagation	
• Depends on phase	
• Independent of WT	 Abortability	
Initial 
Manifestation	
One Explosion	
Loss of Crew	
(Blast and/or Fragments)	
Loss of 
Crew	
Abortable	
Abortable	
Two Explosions	
Loss of 
Crew	
Abortable	
No Explosions	
Selected initiator: Stage 1 turbopump failure 
Paths go horizontally and then vertically 
Simple Propagation Matrix Example!
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Stage 1 TP	
Stage	1	
TurboPump
0% 50% 15%
Stage	1	MCC	
Expl
70% 0% 5% 0%
Aft	Skirt	
Explosion
10% 80% 0%
20% HE	Tank	
Explosion
10% 0%
Stage	1	Tank	
Rupture
50%
100% Stage	1	
Intertank	CBM
Stage	2	Tank	
Rupture
Transition 
Probabilities	
Initiators	
Intermediate 
Environments	
Failure 
Environments	Event Tree	
5 	
Simple Propagation Matrix Example!
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Stage 1 TP	
He Tank Expl	Aft Skirt Expl	
Stage 1 Tank 
Rupture	
Stage 1 Intertank 
CBM	
Stage 1 Tank 
Rupture	
Event Tree	
Stage 1 inter-tank CBM causes (overpressure) Stage 1 tank rupture 
Stage	1	
TurboPump
0% 50% 15%
Stage	1	MCC	
Expl
70% 0% 5% 0%
Aft	Skirt	
Explosion
10% 80% 0%
20% HE	Tank	
Explosion
10% 0%
Stage	1	Tank	
Rupture
50%
100% Stage	1	
Intertank	CBM
Stage	2	Tank	
Rupture
5 	
Monte Carlo results are binned to produce the desired mapping  
(branch splits) between the initial manifestation and the explosion(s)  
Sample Monte Carlo Results!
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Implementation for Complex Cases!
19 
Transition Data Table 
Snippet	
Pre-Launch	
Stage 1 Boost	
Stage 1 Shutdown/Separation	
Phase and propagation 
resistance sensitivities	
Mapping: Dependence on Phase	
Transition Analysis Thought Process!
•  Energy Transfer Mode(s) 
− Overpressure 
− Kinetic Energy (Fragments) 
− Shock & Vibration 
− Environment (pressure, temperature) 
− Etc. 
•  Source Severity 
− Energy type: [KE] 
− Magnitude: [Velocity and density] 
− Uncertainties: [Velocity and density] 
•  Target Vulnerability 
− Energy type: [KE] 
− Magnitude: [Size, Location, Limit velocity] 
− Uncertainties: [Limit velocity] 
•  Energy Decay 
− Natural decay with distance: [1/d2] 
− Obstructions: [%] 
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Example: TP Burst à He tank burst	
Top Down	 Side	
1.
3 
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Self Propagating Failure Scenarios!
Test Case: 4 Engines + Tanks!
•  Simple engine model for generic 
launch vehicle platform  
(derived from J2X) 
•  32 components: 7 per engine and 
4 tanks 
− Main combustion chamber (MCC) 
− 2 turbopumps: fuel (FTP) 
and oxidizer (OTP) 
− 3 pipes (fuel, oxidizer, hot gas) 
− Nozzle 
•  Between ~1k–6k triangles per 
component 
•  3 different initiators:  
MCC, FTP, and OTP 
Tank	
(2) FTP	
(3) OTP	
(1) MCC	
 (4) Nozzle	
(5) Pipe 1	
(7) Pipe 3	
(6) Pipe 2	
Failure Propagation Model!
•  Models failure propagation of debris field 
and blast wave environments 
•  Consists of component-to-component 
interactions and behaviors given  
initial conditions 
•  Uses Monte Carlo framework developed 
in C++: 
− Execution begins by seeding a failure and letting 
it cascade until propagation ends 
− Results include probabilities of component 
vulnerabilities and scenario tracking 
•  100,000 realizations run in ~2 minutes on 
laptop for current test case 
LOM and LOC Probabilities!
•  Interested in specific end results that lead to loss-of-mission (LOM) or 
loss-of-crew (LOC) outcomes 
•  LOM outcome occurs with 2nd engine out – propagation leads to strike 
of a critical component in another engine 
Non-truncated MCC chains, 10k realizations	
Average of 10 different 
failure propagation chains 
per realization.	
Outline!
• Risk Assessment Framework 
• Failure Propagation 
− Propagation Framework 
− Self Propagating Scenarios 
• Blast Overpressure 
• Debris Strike Risk 
− Debris Catalog Modeling 
− Fragment Acceleration 
25 
Integrated Ascent Risk Modeling!
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Blast & Debris Modeling!
•  Engineering-level models: quick, easily 
reconfigurable sensitivity and trade studies 
•  CFD blast wave simulations: more accurate 
blast propagation and interaction effects 
•  CFD tank burst simulations: launch vehicle tank 
failure scenarios 
•  Structural response modeling: effects of blast 
pressures on vehicle 
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Blast Overpressure"
S. Lawrence, D. Mathias, K. Gee, M. Olsen, “Simulation Assisted Risk 
Assessment: Blast Overpressure Modeling, PSAM8, PSAM-0197, 
June 2006.!
S. Lawrence, D. Mathias, “Blast overpressure modeling 
enhancements for application to risk-informed design of human 
space flight launch abort systems,” RAMS, January 2008.!
!
! ! ! ! ! !!
Blast Overpressure Modeling!
• Objectives:  
− Provide data to support requirement definition/refinement/
verification for structural survival of blast loading 
− For a given structure, provide data to support failure 
probability analysis 
− Provide risk information for use in integrated ascent/abort 
risk assessment 
• Key problem elements: 
− Blast size specification (yield %) 
− Blast propagation, including vehicle velocity effects 
• Overpressure decay 
• Blast trajectory (time-of-arrival) 
− Interaction of blast with abort vehicle (LAV) 
− Response of structure to blast loading 
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Explosion Modeling: Engineering-Level Model!
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Crew Risk from Blast 
Overpressure 
Environment 
LEV Thrust 
LEV Drag 
TNT Equivalence 
LEV Weight Location,  Dinit 
Propellant Mass 
Headwinds 
A
A
A
Booster Velocity 
Blast Propagation & 
Interaction Effects Structural Capacity 
Environment Scope 
(Distance Required) 
Time Required to 
Escape 
Warning Time Available 
LAV Trajectory 
Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) Modeling!
− Engineering-level enhancement 
− Blast behavior a function of: 
• Total energy (blast size) 
• Detonation Mach number (blast strength) 
− TNT distribution replaced with 1-parameter 
(Mflame) family of distributions 
• Baker-Strehlow-Tang curve set: Developed 
from 1-D numerical simulations w/ 
simplified chemistry (heat addition) 
− Model includes families of curves for positive-
phase impulse as well as peak overpressure 
Peak Overpressure 
Positive-Phase Impulse 
TNT Equivalency/Sachs Scaling: 
Overpressure:  OP = (pmax - p∞)/p∞ 
Distance:    λ =  x/α	
   	 	    α = (Eprop/p∞)⅓ 
 Time:     τ = t c∞/α 
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Blast Propagation Model!
Headwinds: Navier-Stokes Simulations !
Perfect gas simulations at selected conditions 
along ascent trajectory 
• Increase initial shock strength 
• Increase penetration 
• Sensitive to initial conditions 
ps, ρs, Ts 
V∞=0 
t = 0 
r 
Overpressure Characteristics Effect on Warning Time Required 
Blast Propagation Model!
Structural Response Model!
Overpressure-Impulse (P-I) Failure Criteria!
Failure 
Safe 
Warning Time Requirements 
Warning Time, ms 
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Blast Overpressure: Applications!
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Sensitivity to Uncertain Inputs 
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Debris Strike Risk"
K. Gee, S. Lawrence, “Launch Vehicle Debris Models and Crew Vehicle 
Ascent Abort Risk, RAMS, January 2013.!
K. Gee, S. Lawrence, “Sensitivity Analysis of Launch Vehicle Debris Risk 
Model,” PSAM10, June 2010.!
K. Gee, D. Mathias, “Assessment of Launch Vehicle Debris Risk During 
Ascent Aborts,” RAMS, January 2008.!
!
! ! ! ! ! !!
Debris Model!
• Debris propagation 
− Three degrees-of-freedom (3DOF) trajectory 
integration using MISSION code 
− Trajectories  calculated for: 
• Launch vehicle 
• Crew module 
• Each fragment of potentially dangerous size 
• Initial debris conditions 
 (“Debris Catalog”) 
− Mass distribution based on experimental data 
− Velocity distribution 
• Experimental and historical data 
• Computed results 
• Debris Impact risk determined 
from intersection of CM and 
debris trajectories 
Fragment 
field	
Orion position	
Debris field caused by fragmentation of the 
Ares I CLV during ascent	
Strike probability as a function of MET 
with penetration criterion	
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Mission Elapsed Time	
FTS delay:	
         time 1	
         time 2	
         time 3	
         time 4	
         time 5	
Debris Propagation Model!
Analysis of Debris Strike Probability 
●  Debris catalog generation 
–  Generate debris field based on vehicle dimensions 
and failure mode 
–  Assess sensitivity of strike probability to debris field 
parameters 
●  Response surface approach to predicting strike 
probability 
–  Full Monte Carlo analysis can be computational 
expensive and time-consuming 
–  Investigated accuracy and speed of response 
surface approach 
Ken Gee (Ken.Gee-1@nasa.gov) 42 
Launch Vehicle Debris Catalog 
l  Number of pieces 
l  For each piece 
l  Mass 
l  Reference area 
l  Aerodynamic 
characteristics 
l  Imparted velocity 
Ken Gee (Ken.Gee-1@nasa.gov) 43 
Debris Catalog Model 
l  Number of pieces and mass distribution 
l  Based on analysis of explosion of cylinders 
l  Controlled by average mass of debris pieces 
l  Imparted velocity 
l  Flight termination system (FTS) 
-  Activation of linear shaped charges 
-  Controlled by tank pressures and crack/hole size (venting) 
l  Explosion 
-  CTH solution 
-  Controlled by equivalent mass of TNT 
Sternberg 3-part 	
exponential distribution	
Johnson-Cook fracture	
Grady-Kipp fragmentation	
Vehicle-level Explosion Model II!
Ken Gee (Ken.Gee-1@nasa.gov) 45 
Debris Strike Sensitivity 
●  Current model 
●  Effect of number 
of debris pieces 
●  Warning time = 
0.5 sec 
 
Space Shuttle ET debris model	
Ken Gee (Ken.Gee-1@nasa.gov) 46 
Debris Strike Sensitivity 
●  Current model 
●  Effect of imparted 
velocities 
●  Warning time = 
0.5 sec 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
Physics-Based Fragment Acceleration Modeling 
for Pressurized Tank Burst Risk Assessments"
Ted A. Manning and Scott L. Lawrence!
From 
PSAM12"
48 
Fragment Acceleration Modeling!
•  Energy Partition 
•  Momentum Conservation 
•  Force Driven 
k!E!{
STS-51-L (Challenger)	
Baker Model (1977)	
Problem Statement !
• Problem 
− Baker (1977) tank burst velocity model may not be suitable for low 
yield, lower altitude tank explosions due an external vacuum 
assumption  
• Objective 
− Evaluate / Improve the Baker model 
• Approach  
− Focus on Pressure Burst (no combustion) 
− Run high fidelity fluid/rigid-body simulations (Overflow CFD) 
− Add and/or modify terms in Baker model 
− Compare, Adjust, Iterate 
49 
Original Baker! Modified Baker  !OVERFLOW CFD!
50 
Framework for Tank Burst Modeling!
Infinite Cylinder: 2-dimensional expansion of gas, with gap leakage, N fragments 
Air
p=pa
p=p0>pa Tank Wall
t = 0 t > 0
ψ Expansion
Mass
 Flow
N=3	
N=12	
Computational Fluid Dynamics!
51 
Fragment 
Body Grid 
51 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) 
Simulations!
OVERFLOW CFD!
Background 
Grid 
N=6	
ψ=30°	•  OVERFLOW 2.2 
− Unsteady compressible flow 
− Rigid body dynamics 
− Finite difference 
− Structured overset grids 
− Multi-species fluids 
−   
•  For Tank Burst   
− 2-D with symmetry BC 
− Inviscid 
− 1-DOF rigid body dynamics 
− 2 Overset grids 
− 2~10 million vertices 
− Up to 6000 cpu hours per run on 
NASA Pleiades supercomputer 
pint
p00
p0
Expansion
Initial Tank Pressure
Bulk Pressure
Wall Pressure
Vacuump = 0 OriginalBaker}
Tank Burst Engineering Model (Baker Model)!
•  “Original Baker” (Baker 1977): Isentropic Expansion with Orifice Plate leakage 
52 
Expansion
Mass
 Flow
Original Baker!
p0	
Choked Orifice Flow 	
p∞=0	
53 
•  Modified Baker: 1-D Piston Model with Orifice Plate leakage 
Modifications to Baker Model!
Expansion
Mass
 Flow
Modified Baker !
Choked Orifice Flow 	
with phase-out at pressure reversal	
Delay bulk-pressure p0 reduction 	
due to volume expansion	
p0	 p∞>0	
pint
p00
p0
Expansion
Initial Tank Pressure
Bulk Pressure
Wall Pressure
Vacuump = 0 OriginalBaker}
pext
Compression
Wall Pressure
Ambient Pressure
Modified
Baker}
Fragment Size / Curvature Effects	
54 
Tank Burst Cases!
 STS ET SSME MCC SRB RL10 MCC Baker 6 
Tank contents Air H2, O2, H2O APCP gas H2, O2, H2O Air 
Tank material Aluminum Inconel Steel Inconel Aluminum 
Radius (cm) 420 22.3 184 11 25.4 
Thickness (cm) 0.21 1.24 1.2 1.17 0.68 
p00 {!p} (psi) {22} 3000 800 500 10,000 
T00 (K) 293 3400 3430 3400 272 
p" (atm) 0.001~1.0 1 1 1 1 
Pressure Ratio 1500~2.5 205 54 9 680 
Internal spec. heat ratio !  1.4 1.37 1.155 1.37 1.4 
Fragment count: N 3~24 3~24 4~24 3,12 3~24 
Phase-in !t a0/" Rfrag 1 0.1  1 1 1 
Phase-in factor n 8 8 8 8 8 
Discharge coeff. Cd 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 !
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Compared to Baum Velocity Limit!
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Original Baker! OVERFLOW CFD!Modified Baker !
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STS External Tank: External Pressure Effect!
p∞ = 1 atm p∞ = 0.01 atm 
N=12	
OVERFLOW CFD!
∆p = 1.5 atm 
STS External Tank: Sea Level!
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T00=293K, ∆p=22 psi, γ00=1.4 (Air), Rgas00 = 287 J/kg K	
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Original Baker! OVERFLOW CFD!Modified Baker !
STS External Tank:  
External Pressure Senstivity!
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T00=293K, ∆p=22 psi, γ00=1.4 (Air), Rgas00 = 287 J/kg K	
External Pressure, p∞ = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, and 1 atm	
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STS External Tank: Fragment Count N!
p∞ = 1 atm	N=12 fragments N = 3 fragments 
OVERFLOW!
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P00 = 3000 psi 
p∞ = 14.7 psi (1 atm) 
Mach contours 
N=12	
OVERFLOW CFD!
SSME MCC:	
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Fragment Acceleration Summary!
• Tank Burst Simulations 
− Developed CFD-based capability to predict fragment velocity and 
understand flow field 
• Engineering Modeling 
− Better understand limitations of Baker tank burst velocity model 
− Improved Baker Model account for external atmospheric effects and 
fragment size/curvature 
− Improvements greatest for low altitude tank (low pressure ratio) 
 
• Future Work:  
− Extend Modified Velocity Model 
•  To other burst geometries: sphere and tank domes 
•  Include effects of cryogenics 
− Apply velocity model results to  
•  Debris strike risk assessments 
•  Failure propagation analysis 
− Develop fracture sizing models 
• Risk Assessment Framework 
• Failure Propagation 
− Propagation Framework 
− Self Propagating Scenarios 
• Blast Overpressure 
• Debris Strike Risk 
− Debris Catalog Modeling 
− Fragment Acceleration 
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Engineering Risk Assessment!
